Abstract: There has been a phenomenal global increase in the proportion of women in politics in the last 20 years. While there is evidence that raising the share of women politicians has substantive impacts on the composition of government spending, there is scarcely any evidence of how it influences economic performance. We investigate this using comprehensive data on competitive elections to India's state legislative assemblies, exploiting close elections between men and women to isolate the causal effect of legislator gender in a regression discontinuity design. We identify significantly higher growth in economic activity in constituencies that elect women. Probing mechanisms, we find evidence that women legislators are less likely to be criminal and corrupt, more efficacious, and less vulnerable to political opportunism. We find no evidence of negative spillovers to neighbouring (male-led) constituencies, consistent with net growth.
Introduction
More than 100 countries have introduced quotas for women in parliament or in party lists in the last two decades (Besley et al. 2013; Dahlerup 2006) , and the percentage of women in parliament worldwide has more than doubled in the last 20 years, standing at 22.8 per cent in June 2016. 1 The feminization of politics is one of the most exciting political phenomena of our time. Yet, we do not know what it portends for growth, the rising tide that is thought to lift all boats. In this paper we present the first systematic examination of whether women politicians are good for economic growth.
The association of women with redistributive politics and a tolerance of higher taxes (Campbell 2004; Edlund and Pande 2002; Edlund et al. 2005 ) makes it plausible that, at least in the short to medium term, women politicians are less effective than men at promoting growth. Women have been shown to favour public goods investments, such as in education and health (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2014; ClotsFigueras 2012) , which have only very long-term returns. However, women legislators might promote growth if they are less corrupt (Beaman et al. 2006; Brollo and Troiano 2014) , with visible impacts even in the short term (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001; Mauro 1995; Prakash et al. 2014) . Or, if women who select into public office have a stronger sense of public mission and are more motivated to perform (perhaps to meet higher expectations), they may be more effective at managing economic growth. 2 We know of no causal estimates linking economic performance to the gender of politicians, but a few recent studies examine the impact of women on corporate boards on firm performance. The results of these studies are ambiguous, suggesting negative impacts or no impact (Ahern and Dittmar 2012; Gagliarducci and Paserman 2014; Matsa and Miller 2013) . However, this evidence base is too small to be conclusive, and the gender composition of decision makers may influence economic performance differently in the political and corporate sectors.
Two factors probably contribute to the scarcity of causal evidence on the relationship between legislator gender and economic performance. First, subregional-and, in particular, constituency-level data on economic activity are not available in most countries. We use satellite imagery of night luminosity as a measure of economic performance, following Henderson et al. (2012) and Chen and Nordhaus (2011) . The second constraint on research seeking to produce causal evidence is that constituencies in which women win elections will tend to be systematically different in ways that may be correlated with economic performance. To isolate the role of legislator gender from voter preferences and potentially omitted variables, we use a regression discontinuity design on close elections between men and women. In first-past-the-post elections in which 'the winner takes all', there is a sharp discontinuity at the zero vote margin between the top two candidates. In this setting, the identity (and hence gender) of the winner may be deemed quasi-random (Lee 2008) . Comparing constituencies in which a woman won against a man by a narrow margin ('treated') with those in which a man won against a woman by a narrow margin ('control') can then be argued to isolate the causal influence of leader gender.
We examine data for 4,265 state assembly constituencies for the 1992-2012 period which, in most states, spans four elections. This was a period of strong economic growth. It is also a period in which the share of state legislative assembly seats won by women increased, from about 4.5 per cent to close to 8 per cent. Important for our purposes, there was vast regional variation in both the gender composition of state legislators and luminosity growth (see Figures 1 and 2 ). 1 In contrast, only 12 per cent of corporate board members are women. 2 See, for instance, www.forbes.com/sites/kerryhannon/2010/11/19/top-five-reasons-why-women-flock-to-nonprofit-jobs. We find that women legislators in India raise economic performance in their constituencies by about 1.8 percentage points per year more than male legislators. 3 Estimates on our sample that do not account for selection show no significant relationship between legislator gender and luminosity growth at the constituency level. Similarly, a scatter plot of GDP against the share of women in national parliaments (see Figure A. 3) indicates no relationship between the two variables. This underlines the importance of accounting for selection.
To assess impacts of raising the share of women legislators on overall economic growth, we tested for the possibility of negative spillovers that may arise-for instance, if constituencies compete for shares of the state budget. Using neighbours of every woman-led constituency, we can reject negative spillovers. This is consistent with yardstick competition between neighbours (Besley and Case 1995) and with improvements in publicly provided infrastructure like roads having some positive effect on neighbours as infrastructure does not stop abruptly at constituency boundaries.
In probing mechanisms, we explore differences between male and female legislators in corruption (characteristics and behaviour), efficiency (completion of federally funded road infrastructure projects), and motivation (behaviour as a function of whether the legislator is elected in a swing constituency), each of which has been associated with economic growth in developing countries.
We identify a role for criminality and corruption in explaining better performance under women leaders. Male legislators (in the close election sample) are about three times as likely as female legislators to have criminal charges pending against them, and we estimate that this can explain about one-quarter of the difference in growth between male-and female-led constituencies. We buttress this result with regression discontinuity (RD) estimates of actual corruption in office. Using a measure discussed and validated by Fisman et al. (2014) , we find that the rate at which women accumulate assets while in office is 10 percentage points lower per annum than it is for men. These findings align with experimental evidence that women are more fair, more risk-averse, and less likely to engage in criminal and other risky behaviour than are men (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001; Eckel and Grossman 2008; Fletschner et al. 2010) . 4 Since economic infrastructure is an important input to economic growth, especially in developing countries (Jacoby 2000) , we also analyse legislator performance in implementation of a massive federally funded village road construction programme. We find that, although male and female politicians are equally likely to negotiate federal projects for road building in their constituencies, women are more likely to oversee completion of these projects. We interpret this as a marker of efficacy. Since road construction has higher returns for men (Asher and Novosad 2018) , this finding also establishes that women politicians are not exclusively focused upon serving the interests of women voters, a commonly held claim. 5 Finally, separating the sample into swing and other constituencies, we find that the relative economic performance of women legislators is higher only in non-swing constituencies. This is consistent with greater political opportunism among men or with women legislators having greater intrinsic motivation.
Overall, our analysis of mechanisms suggests that differences in preferences between men and women play a role in determining the better economic performance of women legislators. We provide important new evidence at a time when women are increasingly participating in government across the globe. In India, a historic constitutional amendment proposing to reserve one-third of all federal and state assembly seats for women was passed by the upper house of the federal parliament in 2010. However, this bill still needs to pass the national parliament and state assemblies. Our findings are of interest beyond India, given the scarcity of evidence on the question of how legislator gender is associated with economic performance. We contribute new evidence to a literature on political identity and substantive representation (Besley and Coate 1997; Osborne and Slivinski 1996) that has tended to focus more narrowly upon differences in priorities and preferences of men and women in government.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers contextual information on Indian elections and women's participation. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy. In Section 4, we discuss the electoral and luminosity data. Section 5 presents the main results. In Sections 6 and 7, we discuss alternative interpretations of the results. Section 8 presents a number of extensions. Section 9 concludes.
Context
India is a large federal country with highly competitive multi-party elections monitored by an independent electoral commission. Electoral fraud is uncommon, although some areas suffer from clientelism and elite capture (Anderson et al. 2014) . The current 29 states of the Indian Union are parliamentary democracies in which, typically, a new legislative assembly is elected every five years. There is a high degree of turnover at the state level, with state governments often voted out of office. Assembly constituencies are also characterized by significant turnover. In fact, in contrast to the case of the United 4 These studies do not investigate whether women influence economic growth.
5 For instance, see Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2014) ; Brollo and Troiano (2014) ; Chaney et al. (1998) ; Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004); Clots-Figueras (2012) ; Edlund et al. (2005) ; Iyer et al. (2012); Miller (2007) ; Svaleryd (2009); Thomas (1991) . Among the findings of these studies are that women in politics have influenced the passage of abortion laws in the United States, equal inheritance rights legislation, the reporting of crime against women, and the promotion of public health inputs to child survival in India; and government spending on child care, education, and elderly care in Sweden. A few studies find no significant influence of the gender of local politicians on policy choices (Ferreira and Gyourko 2014; Rigon and Tanzi 2012) States, but similar to the case of Brazil, incumbents in India are less likely to win than challengers (Uppal 2009). Members of legislative assemblies (legislators) are chosen according to a first-past-the-post system in single-member constituencies. Voters vote for individual candidates rather than party lists. Successful candidates are typically appointed and supported by an established party. In fact, parties are crucial arbiters of political careers, given the high costs of running for office in India. In the 2009 federal elections, the average cost of winning a seat was around US$2 million (Tiwari 2014) , a sum that most candidates would struggle to raise without the support of sophisticated party organizations. While there are political quotas for certain minority tribes and castes at the local, state, and national levels, gender quotas in India are only at the local level and only since 1993 (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004) .
State legislators shape policy. They influence the flow of federal funds and the financing of village councils and they are responsible, inter alia, for roads, electricity, law and order, health, and education. Political manipulation by state governments can influence the allocation of federal transfers (Khemani 2006) and of federally funded development programmes (Gupta and Mukhopadhyay 2014) . Legislators can influence economic conditions in their constituencies by, for instance, improving the supply of public services like electricity (Baskaran et al. 2015; Min 2015) , attracting 'pork' by lobbying the state government, exerting efforts to pursue development opportunities, and implementing federal or state government programmes more or less effectively.
Evidence emerging from political quotas in village and town councils and analysis of close elections to state assemblies suggest that women politicians have different priorities from men, tending to favour the concerns of women and children (see references in Section 1). Despite an increase in the share of women legislators, women remain vastly under-represented in Indian federal and state politics, their share oscillating around 10 per cent in recent years (Beaman et al. 2012 ). This reflects not so much lower chances of winning conditional on standing, but that fewer women come forward as candidates (Bhalotra et al. 2017 ). This may be because women dislike competitive or corrupt environments or because party leaders discriminate against women in the nomination process (Spary 2014) . Figure 1 shows that constituencies in which women win are fairly evenly distributed across the country, so our analysis does not pertain to a specific region.
Empirical strategy
We aim to estimate the causal effect of election of a woman legislator on economic activity in her constituency. As discussed in more detail in the following section, there are no constituency-level economic data such as GDP, so we proxy economic activity with night-time luminosity. If the election of women was randomly determined, constituencies that elected a man would serve as a valid counterfactual for constituencies that elected a woman. However, the election of women is unlikely to be random. For instance, one might expect that constituencies with more progressive voters are more likely to elect women, other things being equal. This creates the identification challenge that unobserved differences between constituencies that elect women rather than men are correlated with the outcome (economic activity).
To address this challenge, we exploit the discontinuity in electoral outcomes that arises in first-past-thepost electoral systems by comparing female and male winners in close elections, defined as elections in which the margin of victory between the winner and the runner-up is arbitrarily small. Previous work shows that, in these circumstances, the identity of the winner is quasi-random (Lee 2008 ).
The estimated model is:
where y ist is average growth of light in constituency i in state s over the election term t, and margin ist is the forcing variable. Since we restrict the sample to elections in which the top two vote-getters are a man and a woman, margin ist is the margin of victory, defined as the difference between the vote shares of the female and the male candidates. So, by construction, it is positive when a woman wins against a male runner-up and negative when a male wins against a female runner-up. At a (notional) margin of zero, the gender of the constituency leader changes discontinuously from male to female. We can think of the treatment woman ist as an indicator for the winner being a woman, defined as follows:
The RD design considers a close neighbourhood, λ, around the threshold margin of zero and premises that as λ goes to zero the differences between constituencies that elected a female candidate and those that elected a male candidate vanish, allowing us to identify the causal effect of electing a woman legislator:
This is the difference in the average outcomes of constituencies that barely elected a female legislator against a male runner-up and constituencies that barely elected a male legislator against a female runnerup. Since there is no within-election-term variation in the treatment variable (female legislator), we average the growth of light over an election term. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency level to allow for within-constituency correlation of the errors over time. The regression discontinuity design (RDD) assumption that the distribution of the error term, ε ist , is continuous in the forcing variable is weaker than the identifying assumptions that other selection-on-observables methods rely upon.
We estimate the discontinuity using local linear regressions as suggested by Gelman and Imbens (2014) . We also report results for several bandwidth choices, including the optimal bandwidth procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) . In a further robustness check, we investigate sensitivity of our results to an alternative definition of the victory margin, using the larger sample of all races in which a female contested, irrespective of whether or not she was ranked among the top two in vote share (Meyerson 2014) . As discussed in Section 1, we shall study a number of potential mechanisms, investigate heterogeneity in impact, and conduct several robustness checks. The empirical specifications for these extensions of the main analysis are presented together with the findings below. (Panel C) . In this section, we discuss the luminosity data used to define the dependent variable, the electoral data, and the road construction data.
Data

Night lights data
We use satellite imagery of the earth at night that is gathered by several satellites orbiting the earth under the U.S. Air Force Defense Meteorological Satellite Program's Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS). 6 The data are processed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency's (NOAA) National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) to exclude late-evening sunlight due to longer days in the summer months, the effects of lunar illuminance, observations with clouds, effects of auroral lights, and active fires. The images are scaled onto a geo-referenced 30 arc-second grid (approximately 1 km 2 ). Each pixel is encoded with a measure of its annual average brightness on a six-bit scale from 0 to 63. Night lights data were first digitized in 1992 and our electoral data run through 2012. Henderson et al. (2012) provide a detailed discussion of the satellite data, the filtering done to it, and the caveats to interpreting light growth as economic activity. Importantly, they present various evidence that although GDP is widely gathered and hence used, it is often very unreliable in developing countries where the informal sector is large, making it harder to verify inputs, outputs, incomes, and profits; also see Bhalotra and Umana-Aponte (2015) and Jerven (2013) . GDP and night lights are two errorprone measures of economic activity, and it is unclear which is measured with more error, but the great advantage of night lights data, exploited here, is that they are available at the very local level annually and can be mapped into units of interest such as, in this case, Indian state assembly constituencies.
We overlay a map of 4,265 Indian state assembly constituencies to create constituency-level light output data as the sum of total light emitted by each pixel within constituency boundaries divided by the area of the constituency (light density). We calculated the growth of light as the difference in the logarithm of light density in years t + 1 and t. 7 Since we are interested in the performance of a legislator over an entire election term (usually five years), we create our main outcome variable as average annual growth over an election term and then annualize it.
To validate our contention that night light growth measures economic growth in India, we use statelevel GDP data, which is the smallest administrative unit for which consistent time series data on GDP are available through the study period. Figure 3 plots a scatter of the data which suggests a strong correlation. Panel data estimate that condition on state and year fixed effects indicate that a 1 per cent increase in night lights is associated with a 0.12 per cent increase in GDP (see Table A .3). Using Indian district level GDP data that are available for a few recent years, Bickenbach et al. (2013) estimate an elasticity of 0.107. Using global data, Henderson et al. (2012) estimate an elasticity of about 0.3.
Election data
The In the analysis period, 1992-2012, there are 16,857 constituency-election years. Of these, 1,709 (10.3 per cent) constituency-election years are in the mixed-gender sample, defined as a sample in which a woman and a man are the top two vote-winners. 10 Among mixed-gender elections, 471 (27.6 per cent) Chhattisgarh was allocated 90 constituencies from Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand was allocated 81 constituencies from Bihar. The constituencies themselves remained unchanged. Uttarakhand was allocated 22 constituencies from Uttar Pradesh, which were redrawn into 70 new constituencies.
are close elections, defined as elections with a victory margin of less than 5 per cent. In fact one-third of all Indian elections are won with a victory margin of less than 5 per cent, a marker of how competitive Indian elections are in general. 11 We also utilize data on candidate characteristics drawn from affidavits. The submission of an affidavit became mandatory for all political candidates following a Supreme Court of India order in 2003, the Right to Information Act. The Election Commission of India publishes the affidavits and they contain information on education, assets, liabilities, and criminal accusations. The Association of Democratic Reforms (ADR), an election watchdog, has compiled the information since 2004. 12 Our analysis using candidate characteristics is thus restricted to state elections held between 2004 and 2008, encompassing one election for each state.
Road construction data
We use completion of federally awarded village road building contracts as a proxy for public goods provision at the constituency level. We have administrative data on a centrally sponsored rural roads construction programme, Pradhan Madri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), launched in 2000, that aims to provide all-weather road connectivity in rural areas, and forms an integral part of the government of India's poverty-reduction strategy. This program is unprecedented in its scale and scope (Aggarwal 2017) .
The National Rural Roads Development Agency (NRRDA), which manages the PMGSY programme, places the administrative records of road projects under PMGSY in the Online Management and Monitoring System (OMMS). We accessed road sanctioning and completion dates. The data are available at the census block level, a sub-district census administrative unit. We matched the roads data to state assembly constituencies. 13
Results
Validity of RD design
Validity of the RD design requires continuity of predetermined characteristics of constituencies across the threshold of a zero victory margin. We use a rich set of variables determined before the election in t, either variables from the previous election in t − 1, or outcome variables averaged over the previous electoral term. These include the growth of night lights, the share of incomplete road projects, electorate size (i.e. number of registered voters), number of candidates, turnout, female turnout, whether the legislator was a woman, whether the legislator (in t − 1) was an incumbent, whether the head of the winning party 11 The fraction of all mixed-gender elections that are close, at about one-third, is similar to the share of all elections that are close (irrespective of the gender of the top two vote-winners). The number of close elections is 4,727, which is 28.5 per cent of all elections.
12 www.myneta.info, accessed March 2014. 13 The roads data are at http://omms.nic.in/, accessed May 2015. While there is significant geographical overlap between a census block and an assembly constituency (sharing on average 80 per cent of villages), a census block could span more than one assembly constituency. We assign block-level road variables to an assembly constituency if the constituency contains at least 50 per cent of villages in the block.
was a woman, as well as whether the constituency was reserved for lower castes (Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes), aligned with the state government, and aligned with the central government. Figure 4 reports graphical evidence of the validity of the continuity assumption. For instance, consider Panel (a) which plots average growth of light output in the previous election term against the margin of victory in t. The scatter plot depicts the local averages of growth of light in each successive interval of 0.5 per cent of a margin of victory. The local linear curve is estimated using a triangular kernel and a 5 per cent bandwidth and the 95 per cent confidence interval is shown. The average growth of light in the previous term is a continuous function of the margin of victory. Similarly, we find balance on other constituency characteristics. Overall, the evidence suggests that only the gender of the legislator changes abruptly at the zero margin of victory and that, therefore, we can take the RD design as identifying the causal effect of the election of a woman on economic growth. Table A .4 reports a comparison of means of constituency characteristics in female-versus male-led constituencies in the mixed-gender sample with and without restricting to close elections.
Another potential concern is that there is sorting around the cutoff, which would imply that the winning chances of men and women are not equal even in a close election. Such sorting has been documented in the case of close elections between Republicans and Democrats in the United States, and associated with manipulation of the margin of victory that renders the close election experiment invalid (Caughey and Sekhon 2011; Grimmer et al. 2012; Snyder 2005) . To investigate this, Figure 5 depicts the density of the margin of victory as suggested by McCrary (2008) . There is no apparent discontinuity in the density around the cutoff. The point estimate of the discontinuity is 0.043 with a standard error of 0.075. This suggests there is no evidence of sorting in our sample of close mixed-gender races, and female and male candidates are equally likely to win. The figure (Panel a) also shows that the distribution of the margin by which women win is broadly similar to the distribution of the margin by which men win in mixed-gender races. Note: The figures plot the density of the margin of victory, which is the difference between vote shares of the female and male candidates in mixed-gender races. Mixed-gender races are defined as those in which a man and a woman rank in the top two. By construction, margin of victory is positive for female legislators and negative for male legislators. The magnitude of the discontinuity (log difference in height) is 0.13 (with a standard error of 0.15).
Source: authors, based on the Election Commission of India.
5.2
Main results: legislator gender and economic performance
In this section we present estimates of the causal effect of female relative to male legislators on economic activity over the electoral term in the constituency from which they were elected. The RD estimate of the impact of electing a woman rather than a man is the difference in luminosity at the zero margin of victory.
In Figure 6 , we plot average growth in luminosity against margin of victory. We average the underlying data across bins that each cover 0.5 percentage points in the margin of victory and provide local linear smoothing of the underlying data using a bandwidth of 5 per cent. We observe a discontinuous jump in light output at the threshold margin of victory of zero, suggesting that female legislators raise economic activity more than do male legislators. Note: The dependent variable is the growth of light averaged over an election term against the female margin of victory in mixed-gender races. The victory margin is the difference between the vote shares of the female and male candidates in mixed-gender races. These are races in which a man and a woman are the top two vote-winners. By construction, the margin of victory is positive when women win and negative when men win. Each dot represents a local average in bins of 0.5 per cent margin of victory. The solid lines are the smooth curves estimated using a local linear regression of each variable on the margin of victory separately on either side of the cutoff of zero, using a triangular kernel and a 5 per cent bandwidth. The figures also depict a 95 per cent confidence interval for each variable around the solid curve.
Source: authors, based on data from the Election Commission of India and NOAA's National Geophysical Data Centre.
The corresponding regression estimates are in Table 1 . We estimate a local linear regression of growth of night lights on the margin of victory in the RD framework. The bandwidth is calculated using the optimal bandwidth procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK). The annual luminosity growth averaged over the electoral term is 15.25 percentage points higher in constituencies in which a woman was elected with a small margin than in constituencies in which a man won with a small margin, and this difference is significant at the 5 per cent level (column 1). Using our estimate (from state-year data) of an elasticity of GDP to night lights of 0.12 (see Table A .3), a 15.25 percentage points difference in growth in light translates into a 1.85 percentage points difference in GDP growth. Given that average growth in India during the period of study was about 7 per cent per year, our estimates indicate that the growth premium for constituencies stemming from their having a female legislator is about 25 per cent. Note: The dependent variable is the growth of light,(Log(Light t+1 + 1) − Log(Light t+1 )) × 100, per year (averaged over an election term). Female MLA t is a dummy variable which is 1 for a female legislator and 0 for a male legislator in mixed-gender races in which a female either won or was a runner-up against a male. Column (1) reports estimates from a local linear regression of Growth of Light t+1 on Female MLA t , using a bandwidth determined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman's (2012) optimal bandwidth calculator. The forcing variable is margin of victory (margin t ), which is the difference between vote shares of the female and male candidates. Columns (2) and (3) halve and double the optimal bandwidth. Column (4) additionally controls for the predetermined covariates, constituency and time fixed effects. The predetermined covariates are: Log Electors Sensitivity to bandwidth. We investigated sensitivity of our result to bandwidth choice. Estimates using bandwidths that are half and twice the size of the optimal bandwidth are given in columns (2)-(3). The estimated coefficient declines as the bandwidth increases, but the coefficients in these alternative specifications continue to be similar to the coefficient using the optimal bandwidth. We then revert to the IK optimal bandwidth but control for the predetermined covariates considered in Figure 4 and constituency and year fixed effects (column (4)). The coefficient is again similar. Finally, in column (5) we report results with a second-order local polynomial smoother. Gelman and Imbens (2014) argue against the use of polynomials in RD of higher order than the quadratic. The estimated treatment effect is only slightly larger than that estimated with a local linear control function.
Beyond bandwidth. Looking to the left of the zero victory margin threshold in Figure 6 , we observe higher light growth in the region outside the IK bandwidth, left of about −6 on the horizontal axis. This indicates that men who win by a narrow margin against women achieve lower growth than men who win by a wide margin against women. It also suggests that for a large enough victory margin, men do as well as women although, notably, no better: the curve further left of −6 representing men who win with big margins is about level with the curve to the right of the threshold which represents women winning. This does not challenge our strategy or our findings because the rising part of the curve on the left is outside the optimal bandwidth, and the reason to use the RD design is of course that we expect there is selection in regions far from the zero margin threshold. In other words, a comparison of the growth performance of men and women far from the threshold is potentially confounded by differences in the constituencies in which they win. However, motivated by the dip, we removed from the sample constituency-election years which had either very high or low growth rates of luminosity. The RD plot with these outliers removed is shown in Figure A .1 and the corresponding RD regression in column (1) of Table 2 , which shows that the coefficient, while smaller, remains positive and significant. 14 15
All mixed-gender elections.As a further sensitivity test, following Meyerson (2014) , we estimated regressions with a larger sample that includes all mixed-gender elections in which a woman contested, rather than just elections in which a woman ranked among the top two. The margin of victory is again defined as the difference in the vote shares of the top-ranked female and the top-ranked male candidates, except that now the top-ranked female may not be one of the top two vote-winners. 16 The results are similar to those in Table 1 ; see column (2) of Table 2 . This is because the victory margin in the additional races that are incorporated is likely to be away from the discontinuity and hence unlikely to influence estimates that exploit variation around the threshold of a zero victory margin.
14 Outlying growth rates were identified as larger than 100 or −100 per cent. The analysis sample of elections in which a man and a woman are among the top two vote-winners contains 1,623 constituency-year observations. Of these, 20 observations are outliers according to our criteria. Of the 584 observations that are within the IK bandwidth in our estimation sample, ten are outliers. 15 As the slight curve to the left of the threshold is of descriptive interest, we examined pre-election characteristics of both candidates and constituencies using the sample of mixed-gender races and comparing men who won by a narrow margin defined as 6.68 per cent to correspond to the IK bandwidth with men who won by a wider margin. The characteristics we compare are those we discuss in the tests of balance (RD validity). The only significantly different candidate characteristic is that men who win in close elections carry more criminal charges than men who win with wide margins. The significant differences in the pre-election characteristics of the constituencies in which they win are that men who win by narrow margins are more likely to win in constituencies in which the incumbent is a woman legislator (consistent with these being close elections, and with the results of Bhalotra et al. (2017) ), the party leader is a woman, and the party is not aligned with the state. 16 The margin is by construction positive for elections in which women win. The runner-up is typically the top-ranked man, there being very few elections in which the top two vote-winners are women (about 0.5 per cent of all elections in our time period) and negative for races in which men win.
Gender versus party. We may be concerned that we are capturing the effects of party of the winning legislator rather than of their gender. This seems unlikely since women are not significantly more likely to be from any one of the main parties. Nevertheless, to investigate this concern, we included indicators for whether the legislator is from the Congress or the BJP (with all other parties as the omitted category). The estimates are robust to this (column (4) of Table 2 ).
Spillovers
We have shown that women are more effective than men at increasing growth in their own constituencies. In this section we investigate whether this comes at the cost of lower growth in other constituencies. Specifically, we examine spillovers to contiguous constituencies. All neighbours are in the same state as the index constituency and the vast majority are male-led. Spillovers can, in principle, go in either direction. They may be negative if legislators were playing a zero-sum game with fixed state resources. Alternatively, positive spillovers may arise if, for example, legislators build roads which continue across constituency boundaries, or if road construction in one constituency increases access to markets in neighbouring constituencies. The same applies to electricity networks. Alternatively, successful legislators (women) may encourage yardstick competition, given that previous work suggests that voters evaluate politicians in their jurisdiction by comparing outcomes with those in neighbouring jurisdictions (Besley and Case 1995) .
We define the dependent variable as light growth averaged over neighbours of constituency j identified using a constituency map. The mean (standard deviation) number of neighbours of a constituency is 5.8 (1.6). The independent variable of interest is as before: the gender of the legislator in constituency j. The sample is still restricted to mixed-gender elections for j, and we use the RD approach described for the main analysis. This yields estimates of the difference in light growth in constituencies neighbouring female-versus male-led constituencies. The estimated coefficient is positive, but the difference is not significant, except in column 4 (Table 3 ). 17 
Mechanisms
In this section we attempt to identify differences in characteristics and behaviours of female versus male legislators that may explain the better performance of women legislators in achieving economic growth.
Candidate characteristics
As discussed earlier, data on candidate characteristics are available for elections held during the 2004-2008 period. Using these data, we compared characteristics of male and female legislators in the analysis sample containing mixed-gender close elections. Graphs are presented in Figure A .2 and a comparison of means in Table A .5.
In the close election sample (and also in the sample of all mixed-gender elections), women legislators are significantly less likely than men to be carrying criminal charges. They are also slightly younger on average. There is no significant difference in other characteristics, including education and wealth.
If the difference in criminality between male and female legislators were to translate into a difference in their chances of winning, then this would be problematic for our identification strategy. We examined this-see Table A .7, which shows that criminality has no significant influence on winning chances in the sample of close mixed-gender elections.
The difference in criminality between women and men is larger in the close election sample. Overall, male legislators are twice as likely to be carrying charges, while in the close election sample about 10 per cent of women legislators have pending charges in contrast to about 32 per cent of men. Conditional on being criminally accused, women legislators have significantly fewer charges than men. 18
18 The criminal charges here refer to cases in which an indictment or a charge sheet has been filed. The judicial process in India is very slow and most are never convicted. Following Prakash et al. (2014) , we define financial crimes as charges pertaining to a loss to the public exchequer. We follow the classification used by the ADR for serious crimes which include assaults, kidnapping, and murders. Significant gender differences in criminality among legislators remain within crime categories. While 12.7 per cent (21.8 per cent) of male legislators in a close race carry a financial (serious) charge, only 3.8 per cent (5.7 per cent) of female legislators in a close race face any financial (serious) charges.
Differences in criminality between men and women legislators are consistent with experimental evidence that women are more risk-averse than men (Eckel and Grossman 2008; Fletschner et al. 2010 ) and more patient (Mastrobuoni and Rivers 2016) since risk-taking and high discount factors are positively associated with crime (Eckel and Grossman 2008) .
It seems plausible that legislators with a criminal record are more likely to practise corruption, to have priorities other than economic development, and, possibly, are less likely to provide a stable business environment. A recent paper, using the same criminal charges variable for India, studies the impact of this characteristic on economic activity proxied by luminosity, but without paying any attention to gender (Prakash et al. 2014 ). These authors find that criminality is associated with a 22 percentage point penalty in luminosity growth. We replicate their results in Panel A of Table A .6, using an expanded list of states, and obtain an estimate for the growth penalty of 16.8 percentage points. Scaling this estimate with the difference in the propensity for criminality between men and women (a 21.8 percentage points difference in our close election sample-see Table A .5), back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the difference in criminality explains about 24 per cent of the growth premium of women.
Corruption in office
Having observed that male legislators are much more likely than female legislators to be carrying pending criminal charges when they stand for election, we also investigate whether they are more corrupt while in office. Politicians in office face stricter scrutiny and are subject to a re-election constraint, which may encourage them to act in more accountable ways. Alternatively, they may develop a sense of duty once they attain office if 'office ennobles' (Bénabou and Tirole 2003; Brennan and Pettit 2002) .
Following Fisman et al. (2014) , we use growth in net assets (total assets minus total liabilities) during office as a proxy for corruption. Since assets and liabilities are only recorded in the affidavit data that candidates submit when standing for election, Fisman et al. (2014) restrict the estimation sample to candidates who contest for two consecutive elections, whether or not they win. They then compare asset growth for winners with asset growth for runners-up in close races. They acknowledge the selection issues that arise with this sample restriction in some detail, and after a fairly comprehensive assessment, they conclude that analysis of this sample provides useful insight. They find that Indian state legislators who are elected into office with a narrow margin witness a larger growth in net assets through their five-year tenure than do candidates who came close but did not win, estimated as a difference of 3-5 per cent per annum. They interpret this as evidence that politicians leverage public office for private benefits by engaging in rent-seeking activities.
Fisman et al. (2014) do not distinguish between male and female legislators. We adopt their strategy but rather than compare winners with runners-up in close races, we compare women who won in a close race with men who won in a close race. In Figure 7 we plot growth of net assets between elections t + 1 and t against the margin of victory between winners and losers (of opposite gender) in election t. By construction, the margin of victory is positive for female winners and negative for male winners. We find a discontinuity in growth in net assets at the zero margin of victory, indicating lower growth in net assets among female relative to male legislators. Regression estimates are shown in Table 4 . Column (1), using the IK bandwidth, shows that net asset growth during an electoral term is about 50 percentage points lower among female legislators. This translates into a 10 percentage point per annum difference in the rate at which male versus female legislators accumulate rents in office. As a benchmark, note that the mean annual growth rate of net assets in the sample (averaging over all legislators) is 20 percentage points. 19 Note: The dependent variable is the growth of net assets plotted against margin of victory, which is the difference between the vote shares of the female and male candidates who rank in the top two vote-winners in mixed-gender elections. The sample is restricted to candidates who re-contest. Each dot represents a local average in bins of 0.5 per cent margin of victory. The solid lines are the smooth curves estimated using a local linear regression of each variable on margin of victory separately on either side of the cutoff of zero, using a triangular kernel and a 5 per cent bandwidth. The figure also depicts a 95 per cent confidence interval for each variable around the solid curve.
Source: authors, based on data from the Election Commission of India.
If we halve the bandwidth, this coefficient is similar but less precisely determined (column (2)). If we double the bandwidth, the coefficient falls to 3 percentage points, suggesting that the difference weakens as we move away from the discontinuity (column (3)). The next two columns show that the result is robust to conditioning on covariates and fixed effects and to replacing the linear with a quadratic polynomial.
Overall, the evidence suggests that women legislators are less likely than men to exploit their office for personal financial gain. It establishes corruption as a likely contributor to the economic advantage of women legislators, given evidence that lower corruption is conducive to economic growth (Dollar et al. 2001; Mauro 1995; Prakash et al. 2014; Swamy et al. 2001) . 20 19 According to Panel A of Table A .2, average asset growth over a five-year term is 100 percentage points in the full sample, so annual asset growth is 20 percentage points. 20 We have analysed two proxies for corruption-one pertains to the legislator carrying pending criminal charges against them at the time they file their candidacy, and the other to the measure of the rent they accumulate during office if elected. As a coherence check, we confirmed that these two measures are positively associated with one another. Although the coefficient is not statistically significant it is sizeable, (i.e. legislators who entered office carrying criminal charges experience higher net asset growth in office (Panel C of Table A.6)). 
Road infrastructure
We next investigate a hard outcome that is growth-producing. In general and especially in developing countries, road infrastructure is a key ingredient to growth. Rural roads are estimated to have significant positive effects on local economic outcomes, including growth and structural transformation, involving the decline of agricultural work in favour of wage work ( We use administrative data from the PMGSY or Village Road Programme which was launched in 2000 with the goal of providing all-weather access to unconnected habitations across India. The PMGSY is a useful case to analyse for the following reasons. First, it is a massive nationwide programme of considerable political and economic significance. Between 2000 and 2015, it had funded the construction of over 400,000 km of roads (over 100,000 new roads), benefiting almost 200,000 villages at a cost of almost US$40 billion (Asher and Novosad 2018) . Second, efficacy of this programme is likely to be a good marker for public goods delivery. Importantly, it involves state legislators bidding for federal funds and delivering goods at the local level. 21 Programme eligibility involved the village having a population above 1,000 till 2003 and above 500 after that date. Therefore, validity of the RD design we use requires that constituencies won by men versus women in close elections are not systematically different in population size, in particular around these thresholds. Using the 2001 census files, and using both threshold and average population figures at the village level, we test this premise just like we test for continuity across the zero vote margin threshold for other constituency characteristics. The results are in presented in Table A .10 and show no significant differences in population size.
Using data for 2004-2012 and the same RD approach as used for the main analysis, we investigate whether the share of incomplete roads relative to awarded road projects is a function of legislator gender. While we find no significant difference in contracts allocated (Panel B of For our purposes, this result suggests that women are more effective at completing road projects and hence creating infrastructure for growth. It challenges any presumption that men are more effective at delivering growth-producing infrastructure. More clearly, since road construction in India has been shown to produce higher returns in terms of job mobility for men than for women (Asher and Novosad 2018) , our findings establish that women are not only good at serving the interests of women. The qualities that lead women to achieve higher completion rates may include efficiency, mission, or lower corruption, all of which are related to effective delivery of public goods. 23 22 The mean number of road contracts won (by male and female legislators alike) in the close mixed-gender election sample is 3.5. If an additional fifth of these is left incomplete in male-led constituencies, that implies about 0.7 fewer roads on average. We examined costs associated with a project and found no significant differences in constituencies led by female and male legislators. 23 Here we report results for roads because we have access to unusually good local-level data on a public infrastructure programme of large political and economic significance. We could not find similar data for other infrastructure. In India, electricity is, like roads, an important state-provided infrastructural good (Lal 2005) . Several studies suggest that electricity is the lifeblood of the modern economy (Dinkelman 2011; Lipscomb et al. 2013; Rud 2006 ) and, in India, power shortages are common and have been shown to significantly reduce output and revenues (Allcott et al. 2014) . Moreover, electricity often features as one of the top priorities of Indian voters in election surveys (Chhibber et al. 2004 ). We measure economic activity using night lights data and it is implicit that this is a proxy for electricity demand. However, to the extent that women legislators better provide electricity (for the same reasons that they better provide roads), some of the better performance of women leaders may reflect better electricity supply.
Political opportunism
A large literature on distributive politics highlights that a drawback of democratic politics is that politicians have an incentive to distort economic policies to pursue a narrow electoral agenda (e.g. Cole (2009); Golden and Min (2013) ; Mani and Mukand (2007) ) and in models of political accountability, politicians are inherently opportunistic, being more likely to exert effort or avoid rent-seeking activities if they face sufficient electoral incentives (Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferejohn 1986 ).
On the other hand, some politicians may be intrinsically motivated (Brennan and Pettit 2002; Bénabou and Tirole 2003) , exerting effort irrespective of the extent of electoral competition. As there are economic costs of opportunism, we investigated whether the weaker growth performance of male legislators could be traced to greater political opportunism among men. We do this by comparing the male-female difference in performance in swing versus core constituencies. The premise is that there are stronger electoral incentives in swing constituencies.
To identify swing and core constituencies, we rely on information on the previous election. We define constituencies where the margin of victory in the previous election was below 5 per cent as swing (i.e. relatively competitive) constituencies and all other constituencies as core constituencies. Around 32 per cent of all constituencies in the close mixed-gender sample are defined as swing according to these criteria. The idea is that constituencies where the margin of victory was close in two consecutive elections (the election that we model as won by men versus women, and the one before) are ceteris paribus more competitive than constituencies where only the most recent election was close.
Results are in Table 6 . We estimate the baseline specification (as in Table 1 ) on the two subsamples of swing and non-swing constituencies with close mixed-gender elections. In swing constituencies, growth does not depend upon the legislator's gender. In contrast, female-led non-swing constituencies have significantly higher growth rates than male-led non-swing constituencies. One explanation of this is that women legislators are less opportunistic and exhibit higher intrinsic motivation. 24 Notice that, in so far as the behaviour of women in our sample appears not to be driven by the strength of electoral competition, the results in this section suggests external validity of our main findings (which are estimated on a sample of close and hence competitive elections). Note: Swing constituencies are constituencies in which the margin of victory was below 5 per cent in the previous election.
Covariates in Column (4) include predetermined variables, state, and time fixed effects. We omit the constituency fixed effects in Column (4) due to insufficient within-constituency variation in the subsamples. See notes to Table 1 .
Extensions
In this section we investigate differences in the relative performance of male and female legislators in subsamples distinguished by party alignment and gender of the state minister, the education of the legislator, and an indicator of human development (a correlate of corruption) at the state level.
Party alignment and gender of state minister
The evidence suggests that state governments may have an incentive to favour aligned politicians when they allocate public resources (Asher and Novosad 2017; Brollo and Nannicini 2012) . Thus, aligned legislators may have more resources to work with, and if women legislators make better use of these resources, this will reinforce their positive effect on growth.
We investigated heterogeneity by alignment (i.e. whether women do better than men in constituencies that are versus are not aligned with the state). 25 See Table A.8. We find that the difference between female and male legislators is larger in the aligned sample, but not statistically significantly different from the unaligned sample.
If female chief ministers favour female legislators, this may contribute to their relative success. To investigate this, we estimate the baseline RD specification with subsamples of states ruled by female versus male chief ministers. The results are presented in Table A .8. We find no significant difference in growth by legislator gender in the roughly 15 per cent of constituencies with female chief ministers. The sample is small but the coefficient is not just imprecise, but small. We therefore see no evidence of favouritism along the lines of gender. The sample with male chief ministers (the overwhelming majority of states) exhibits a difference in favour of female legislators similar to the full sample results.
Education of legislator
We showed earlier that there is on average no significant difference in the level of education of female and male legislators in the close mixed-gender sample. So education is unlikely to be a mechanism. However, given an interest in the relationship between politician education and policy choices (Besley et al. 2011) , we investigate whether the relative success of women emerges from samples of more or less educated legislators.
We separate the sample into constituencies led by legislators with and without a college education; see Table A .8. We find that growth in luminosity is only higher for women-led constituencies in the sample in which leaders have less than college education.
One explanation for this result that is consistent with our discussion of mechanisms is that male-female differences in criminality are greater in this sample. In both samples (with and without college education) the share of women legislators carrying criminal charges is similar (13 versus 14 per cent). However, the share of men with criminal charges is larger among non-college-educated legislators, at 32 per cent versus 25 per cent. 26
Institutional environment
If clean governance is an important reason that women-led constituencies experience higher growth, we may expect that women make a larger difference in institutional environments where (male-dominated) corruption is pervasive. We investigate this using the Human Development Index (HDI) as a proxy for the prevailing quality of government (Sen and Dreze 2005) . We split the sample into the relatively developed versus underdeveloped states based on their HDI, using the median HDI value in 1999 as the threshold. We re-estimate the baseline model on the two subsamples; see Table 7 . The result that women are better than men at producing growth is only statistically significant in the less developed states. 27 One reason for this difference is likely to be that male and female legislators have more similar criminal propensities in the more developed states (recall that we have already shown that they are balanced on other observables, including education and wealth in the analysis sample). However, in the less developed states, male legislators are more likely than female legislators to have criminal histories. They exhibit a 5 percentage point greater likelihood of carrying financial crime charges (10.7 per cent versus 15.6 per cent) and a 7 percentage point difference in carrying serious criminal charges (23.3 per cent versus 30.6 per cent). In line with this, we show that asset growth in office is higher for men than for women, primarily in the less developed states sample (Table 7) . This result is consistent with Fisman et al. (2014), who found that, in general (i.e. not distinguishing gender of legislator), rents from public office are higher in less developed states.
Overall, these findings are consistent with the results in Section 7, which highlight the relevance of criminal histories and corruption in office in explaining our finding that constituencies led by women legislators exhibit stronger economic performance.
In summary, our findings that the better performance of women legislators stems from the less developed states and from the sample of less educated legislators can be (at least partially) traced to these subsamples exhibiting larger differences by legislator gender in criminal charges and corruption. Comparison of coefficient magnitudes suggests that women are more effective than men when the constituency leader is aligned with the state-level party, but the difference is not statistically significant. There is no evidence that women legislators are more effective when the state chief minister is a woman, so we can reject favouritism between women as a channel for the success of women leaders.
External validity
While RD is regarded as producing consistent or internally valid estimates of causal effects, a common concern is that the estimates may have limited external validity. We assess this in three different ways. First, we refer to previous work for India (Bhalotra et al. 2017) , which examines voter preferences for women candidates measured as the vote share obtained by all women contesting in constituencies in which there are close mixed-gender elections. They show that this share ranges from less than 20 per cent to 65 per cent. This wide variation in preferences for female politicians suggests external validity of results from the close sample.
Second, the same authors show that among constituencies that have at least one mixed-gender election, nearly 60 per cent have had only one or two mixed-gender elections over a period of three decades. This again points to external validity in as much as it establishes that our RD estimates do not capture features specific to mixed-gender constituencies.
Third, we compare characteristics of constituencies in the sample of mixed-gender elections divided up as close versus non-close elections; see columns (1)- (3) of Table A .9. We find very few differences. Constituencies with close mixed-gender elections are slightly more likely to have a female incumbent and a female party head and less likely to be aligned with the state government. Although the RD design does not require balance on candidate characteristics, for the descriptive purpose of understanding candidate selection into close elections we also compared candidate characteristics in close versus nonclose mixed-gender elections. The only significant difference we find is that, on average, candidates have a larger number of criminal cases in close mixed-gender elections (consistent with our discussion of the external validity of our baseline results in Section 5.2). 28 We estimated OLS regressions using the universe of elections in India, and panel data identification. We find no significant impact of legislator gender on growth. 29 As discussed in Section 1, there is similarly no correlation between politician gender and growth (GDP) in cross-country data (see Figure A. 3). This suggests negative OLS bias, or that women legislators are in general selectively elected in areas with lower growth potential. Since the causal effect of women on growth is not readily evident in observational data, it is important to investigate this relationship using techniques for causal identification in other settings.
Conclusion
We estimate that women legislators in India raise luminosity growth in their constituencies by about 15 percentage points per annum more than male legislators. This translates to a difference of about 1.8 percentage points in annual GDP growth. Given that average growth in India during the sample period was about 7 per cent, our estimates indicate that the growth premium for constituencies stemming from their having a female legislator is about 25 per cent. Evidence cited in Section 1 showing that women politicians are more effective at delivering health and primary education (and hence in creating human capital) suggests that the impact of women leaders on long-term growth may be even larger.
We find no evidence of negative spillovers from female-led constituencies. The evidence thus suggests considerable positive overall growth gains. The growth advantage conferred by women leaders is not apparent in observational data from India or from a cross-country database, but is evident once selection into office is accounted for.
We provide, as far as we know, the first causal estimates linking legislator gender to economic activity. A considerable body of evidence has demonstrated that women politicians more effectively represent the interests of women and children. As pro-female and pro-family policies are often associated with welfare payments, one may expect that widening the representation of women in government compromises growth, at least over a period as short as an electoral term. However, no previous work has attempted to investigate this. Our results reject such concerns, establishing that not only is growth unharmed but, indeed, it is enhanced under women's leadership.
Investigating mechanisms, we find that women are only about one-third as likely as men to be carrying pending criminal charges when they enter office; their assets grow by about 10 percentage points per annum less while in office (a measure of rent-seeking); and for an equal number of funded village road contracts, the share of incomplete road projects is 22 percentage points lower. We find that women are good for growth only in non-swing constituencies, consistent with male legislators exerting additional effort or averting corruption in swing constituencies in which electoral incentives are stronger. All of these results are consistent with women being less corrupt, more effective, and less opportunistic (in terms of being less responsive to electoral incentives).
Laboratory evidence, cited earlier, suggests that there are inherent differences in preferences between women and men (fairness, altruism, higher risk aversion, lower overconfidence) that are predictive of corrupt or criminal behaviour, and other studies, cited earlier, indicate that women may have stronger intrinsic motivation in occupations that generate public benefits. For these reasons, we may find that women legislators outperform men in many environments. We find some evidence that the gender gap in legislator performance is smaller in the more developed states of India, and in the sample of constituencies in which the legislator has a college education. In both cases, this is consistent with lower criminality and corruption among men in these subsamples, in particular, a smaller gender gap in criminality and corruption. Thus, to the extent that opportunities for corruption are more limited in more developed countries, women may be especially effective relative to men at producing growth in less developed countries. Note: Full sample is the sample of the all races during the period 1992-2008. Mixed-gender sample is the sample of races in which a female candidate placed either first or second against a male candidate. The unit of observation is an assembly constituency. Each data point is a constituency-election year observation. For annual data, we compute election term averages. The source of the election data and candidate characteristics, such as criminal records, education, assets, and liabilities, is the Election Commission of India. The source of night lights data is NOAA's National Geophysical Data Center.
Source: authors, based on data from the Election Commission of India and NOAA's National Geophysical Data Center. Note: Columns (1)-(3) compare unconditional means of predetermined constituency variables between female-led constituencies and male-led constituencies in our mixed-gender races sample. Columns (4)-(6) additionally condition the sample to close races that are decided by a margin of 5 per cent or less. Standard deviations in parentheses except in columns (3) and (6), which have standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels from tests of no differences, respectively.
Source: authors, based on data from the Election Commission of India and NOAA's National Geophysical Data Centre. (3) compare unconditional means of candidate characteristics between female-led constituencies with male-led constituencies in our mixed-gender races sample. Columns (4)-(6) additionally condition the sample to close races that are decided by a margin of 5 per cent or less. Standard deviations in parentheses except in columns (3) and (6), which have standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels from tests of no differences, respectively.
Source: authors, based on data from the Election Commission of India. Note: This table estimates the RD effect of being criminally accused on probability of winning. In Panel A, the sample is races in which a candidate with criminal accusations either won or was the runner-up against a candidate with no accusations. In Panel B, the sample is mixed-gender races in which a candidate with criminal accusations either won or was the runner-up against a candidate with no accusations. The dependent variables is a dummy variable which is 1 if a candidate wins and 0 otherwise. Criminal is a dummy variable which is 1 if a candidate has any criminal charges against him or her and 0 otherwise.
Source: authors, based on data from the Election Commission of India. Note: Columns (1)-(3) compare mixed-gender races in which the victory margin was within 5 per cent with mixed-gender races with a larger victory margin. Columns (4)-(6) compare mixed-gender races with non-mixed-gender races. Mixed-gender races are the sample of races in which a female candidate placed either first or second against a male candidate. Standard deviations in parentheses except in columns (3) and (6), which have standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels from tests of no differences, respectively.
Source: authors, based on data from the Election Commission of India, NOAA's National Geophysical Data Centre, and PMGSY's Online Management, Monitoring and Accounting System. Note: The village population data are from the 2001 census. Female MLA t is a dummy variable which is 1 for a female legislator and 0 for a male legislator in mixed-gender races. The forcing variable is margin of victory (margin t ), which is the difference between vote shares of the winning and runner-up candidates in mixed-gender races. Column (1) reports estimates from a local linear regression of average village population on female MLA t , using a bandwidth determined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman's (2012) optimal bandwidth calculator. The dependent variables are proportion of villages with population of 500 or more in column (2) and proportion of villages with population of 1,000 or more in column (3). The kernel used is triangular and standard errors are in parentheses. Note: Each variable is plotted against the female margin of victory in mixed-gender elections, which is the difference between vote shares of a female candidate and male candidate in mixed-gender elections. Mixed-gender elections are those in which a woman either won or was a runner-up against a man. By construction, the margin of victory is positive for female legislators and negative for male legislators. Each dot represents a local average in bins of 0.5 per cent margin of victory. The solid lines are the smooth curves estimated using a local linear regression of each variable on the margin of victory separately on either side of the cutoff of zero, triangular kernel and a 5 per cent bandwidth. The figures also depict a 95 per cent confidence interval for each variable around the solid curve.
Source: authors, based on data from the Election Commission of India. 
